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Pictorial examples during creative thinking tasks can lead participants to fixate on these examples 
and reproduce their elements even when yielding suboptimal creative products. Semantic memory 
research may illuminate the cognitive processes underlying this effect. Here, we examined whether 
pictures and words differentially influence access to semantic knowledge for object concepts 
depending on whether the task is close- or open-ended. Participants viewed either names or 
pictures of everyday objects, or a combination of the two, and generated common, secondary, or 
ad hoc uses for them. Stimulus modality effects were assessed quantitatively through reaction 
times and qualitatively through a novel coding system, which classifies creative output on a 
continuum from top-down-driven to bottom-up-driven responses. Both analyses revealed 
differences across tasks. Importantly, for ad hoc uses, participants exposed to pictures generated 
more top-down-driven responses than those exposed to object names. These findings have 
implications for accounts of functional fixedness in creative thinking, as well as theories of 
semantic memory for object concepts.
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The use of examples as instructional tools or as springboards for creative idea generation is 
widespread among students and professionals in many fields across science, engineering, 
design, and the arts. Psychological studies on creative problem solving have explored factors 
that determine whether or not one’s knowledge about the world or experience with a 
particular kind of problem or situation can facilitate efforts to solve a new problem with 
similar features. This phenomenon of analogical transfer is well-established in the creativity 
literature (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Holyoak, 1984, 2005). However, analogical 
transfer is not always positive. Under certain circumstances, prior knowledge or experience 
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with a particular example or solution strategy may have negative effects for creative thought 
(e.g., Gentner, 1983; Osman, 2008). Functional fixedness or fixation is an instance of such 
negative transfer, wherein a solver’s experience with a particular function of an object 
impedes using the object in a novel way during creative problem solving (Duncker, 1945; 
Scheerer, 1963).
A number of studies have demonstrated that the presence of pictorial examples may 
exacerbate functional fixedness during creative generation—or open-ended—tasks (i.e., 
tasks that do not appear to have one correct solution and for which the solution possibilities 
appear infinite). Such tasks are presumed to rely primarily on divergent thinking, a notion 
that was originally introduced by Guilford (1950; 1967) to describe a set of processes 
hypothesized to result in the generation of ideas that diverge from the ordinary. For example, 
Jansson and Smith (1991; see also Purcell & Gero, 1996) asked engineering design students 
and professionals to generate as many solutions as possible for a series of such open-ended 
design problems (e.g., design a bike-rack for a car). Participants who were shown example 
designs with the problems were significantly more likely to conform to those examples 
relative to participants who were asked to solve the problems without such examples. The 
phenomenon is not exclusive to design experts. Chrysikou and Weisberg (2005) have 
demonstrated that in similar open-ended design tasks, naïve-to-design participants who were 
shown a problematic pictorial example produced significantly more elements of the example 
in their solutions and included more flaws in their designs, relative to participants who were 
not shown such examples or who were explicitly instructed to avoid them. Similarly, Smith, 
Ward, and Schumacher (1993; see also Ward, Patterson, & Sifonis, 2004) asked participants 
to imagine and create designs for different categories (e.g., animals to inhabit a foreign 
planet, new toys). Participants who were shown pictorial examples tended to conform to 
these examples, even after completing a distractor task prior to generating their solutions or 
being instructed to avoid reproducing the example solutions.
Overall, research on design fixation suggests that naïve participants and experts alike are 
susceptible to the effects of negative transfer from pictures during divergent thinking tasks. 
That is, in open-ended creative problem-solving tasks, pictorial examples appear to influence 
how participants retrieve aspects of their knowledge about certain objects or situations to 
solve the problem at hand. As a result, they tend to fixate on pictorial examples and 
reproduce their elements, strikingly even in cases where the examples are explicitly 
described as problematic. Why would pictorial examples have such a constraining effect to 
creativity? In other words, why would pictures bias semantic memory retrieval in a 
particular way during creative generation (e.g., design, artistic) tasks? Although traditionally 
not discussed in this context, research on the organization and function of semantic memory 
may shed some light on the cognitive processes underlying functional fixedness from 
pictures during divergent thinking. Behavioral, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging 
evidence suggest that pictures and words may access different components of semantic 
memory, and, thus, may make certain aspects of our knowledge about the world more salient 
than others depending on context and circumstances.
Indeed, one of the key questions concerning research on the structure and organization of 
knowledge bears on the format of object knowledge representations (e.g., analog versus 
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symbolic). Earlier theories (e.g., Paivio, 1986) examined the possibility of distinct systems 
through which this semantic knowledge would be represented, for example, a dual code for 
the processing of visual and verbal information. The influence of stimulus format (e.g., 
whether pictorial or verbal) on the retrieval of object knowledge has been explored in early 
investigations of semantic processing which revealed both similarities and differences in 
reaction times and accuracy for a variety of tasks (e.g., naming, lexical or object decision 
tasks, priming manipulations, interference effects; Glaser, 1992; Kroll & Potter, 1984; Potter 
& Faulconer, 1975; Potter, Valian, & Faulconer, 1977).
Later studies suggested that pictures might allow for privileged access to knowledge about 
functions and motor actions associated with the typical use of the object (relative to other 
semantic information), whereas words might permit direct access to phonological and lexical 
(prior to semantic) information (see Glaser & Glaser, 1989). For example, when asked to 
name and make action decisions (e.g., pour or twist?) and semantic/contextual decisions 
(e.g., found in kitchen?) about words or pictures of common objects, participants were faster 
at reading words than naming pictures, whereas they were faster in making action and 
semantic/contextual decisions for pictures than for words (Chainay & Humphreys, 2002; see 
also Rumiati & Humphreys, 1998; Saffran, Coslett, & Keener, 2003). Furthermore, using a 
free association task, Saffran, Coslett, and Keener (2003) reported that pictures elicited more 
verbs than did verbal stimuli, particularly for non-living, manipulable objects. Finally, 
Rumiati and Humphreys (1998) have shown that when generating a use-relevant gesture in 
response to the name or line drawing of an object, participants made more visual (relative to 
semantic) errors with pictures but not with words (i.e., they generated a gesture appropriate 
for an item that was visually similar to the target, but not associated with either the target or 
from the same functional category, e.g., making a hammering gesture in response to a 
picture of a razor).
Dissociations in performance on semantic knowledge tasks that use pictorial and verbal 
stimuli have also been reported in studies of neuropsychological patients. For instance, 
patients with optic aphasia exhibit an inability to retrieve the names of objects presented 
visually, whereas their performance with lexical/verbal stimuli remains unimpaired (e.g., 
Hillis & Caramazza, 1995; Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987). In contrast, Saffran, Coslett, 
Martin, and Boronat (2003) describe the case of a patient with progressive fluent aphasia 
who exhibited significantly better performance on certain object recognition tasks when she 
was prompted with pictures relative to words. These and other findings from patients with 
neuropsychological deficits (e.g., Lambon Ralph & Howard, 2000; McCarthy & Warrington, 
1988; Warrington & Crutch, 2007; see also Humphreys & Riddoch, 2007; Riddoch, 
Humphreys, Hickman, Cliff, Daly, & Colin, 2006) further suggest that pictures and words 
may access different types of semantic information.
A number of Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) studies using a variety of tasks (e.g., classification, similarity matching, 
working memory) with pictorial and verbal stimuli, have offered evidence for a common 
semantic system for pictures and words in the ventral occipitotemporal cortex. However, 
modality-specific activations were also reported in posterior brain regions when action-
related conceptual properties were accessed by pictures and in anterior temporal brain 
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regions when more complex conceptual properties were accessed by words (Bright, Moss, & 
Tyler, 2004; Gates & Yoon, 2005; Postler, De Bleser, Cholewa, Glauche, Hamzei, & Weiller, 
2003; Sevostianov, Horwitz, Nechaev, Williams, From, & Braun, 2002; Vandenberghe, 
Price, Wise, Josephs, & Frackowiak, 1996; Wright et al., 2008; see also Chao, Haxby, & 
Martin, 1999; Tyler, Stamatakis, Bright, Acres, Abdallah, Rodd, & Moss, 2004).
Overall, behavioral, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging findings support a common 
semantic knowledge system in which object concepts are distributed patterns of activation 
over multiple properties, including perceptual properties (e.g., shape, size, color), motoric 
properties (e.g., use-appropriate gesturing, mode of manipulation), and abstract properties 
(e.g., function, relational information) that can be differentially tapped by pictorial or verbal 
stimuli based on the requirements of a given task (Allport, 1985; Humphreys & Forde; 2001; 
Plaut, 2002; Shallice, 1993; Tyler & Moss, 2001; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987; see also 
Chainay & Humphreys, 2002; Rumiati & Humphreys, 1998; Thompson-Schill, 2003; 
Thompson-Schill, Kan, & Oliver, 2006). Particularly relevant to their potential influence on 
creative generation or divergent thinking tasks, stimuli in pictorial format may allow for 
direct access to functional, action-related information (e.g., use-appropriate gesturing, 
manner of manipulation, object-specific motion attributes), whereas stimuli in verbal format 
may allow for direct access to other lexical and semantic information.
The Present Study
The investigation of the differential tapping of semantic memory for object concepts by 
pictures and words has previously exclusively involved simple classification tasks (e.g., 
naming, gesture generation, similarity judgments), yet these findings may also have 
important implications for creativity and divergent thinking, specifically in the context of 
everyday problem solving tasks involving common objects. Indeed, given the apparent link 
between pictorial stimuli and information related to an object’s canonical function and mode 
of manipulation as discussed above, pictorial stimuli may induce functional fixedness to an 
object’s normative or depicted use during creative problem solving. In other words, pictorial 
stimuli may render properties related to the already-learned actions associated with a given 
object more salient than others, hence impeding performance on divergent thinking tasks.
Despite its potential importance for understanding the cognitive processes underlying 
creative thinking, research exploring how the structure and function of semantic memory for 
objects may guide participant’s performance during open-ended tasks has been limited (e.g., 
Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007; Chrysikou, 2006, 2008; Keane, 1989; Valeé-
Tourangeau, Anthony, & Austin, 1998; see also Walter & Kintch, 1985). Notably, Valeé-
Tourangeau et al. (1998) asked participants to instantiate taxonomic and ad hoc categories 
for objects and to report retrospectively the strategies they followed to perform the task. An 
analysis of these reports revealed that during category instantiation participants largely relied 
on the retrieval of examples from their personal experiences, and significantly less so on the 
retrieval of abstract, encyclopedic information about category members. In addition, 
Gilhooly et al. (2007) presented participants with the Alternative Uses divergent thinking 
task (Christensen & Guilford, 1958) in which they were asked to generate as many 
alternative uses as possible for six common objects. Some participants were asked to think 
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aloud during the task and a record of their thought processes was analyzed according to the 
type of memory retrieval strategy participants followed during the task. It was found that 
participants’ earlier responses were based on a top-down strategy of retrieval from long-term 
memory of already known uses for the objects. In contrast, later responses were based on 
bottom-up strategies, such as generating object properties or disassembling the object into its 
components. Importantly, the novelty of the generated uses was positively correlated with 
the bottom-up, disassembling strategy.
Overall, past work has demonstrated that (a) the presence of pictorial examples may lead to 
functional fixedness in open-ended creative thinking tasks, (b) pictures and words may 
access different components of semantic memory, and (c) people may rely more or less on 
top-down or bottom-up strategies when accessing their knowledge about objects depending 
on task demands. However, despite the reported deleterious effects of pictorial examples for 
problem solving as discussed above, in conjunction with studies demonstrating privileged 
access to action-related information from pictorial stimuli in close-ended, convergent 
thinking tasks, no study has explored how the modality of the stimulus (verbal or pictorial) 
may influence whether participants will adopt a top-down or a bottom-up memory retrieval 
strategy in open-ended, divergent thinking tasks.
Accordingly, the present experiment examined whether pictures and words will differentially 
influence access to semantic knowledge for object concepts depending on whether the task 
is close- or open-ended. We built on previous work on semantic memory retrieval that has 
focused on close-ended, convergent thinking tasks (i.e., tasks having a specific correct 
response) by exploring the effects of verbal and pictorial stimuli on the Object Use task (a 
version of the Alternative Uses, divergent thinking task adapted from Christensen & 
Guilford, 1958). In each of three subcomponents of the task, the requirements vary such that 
participants can retrieve from memory and generate the typical function for an object 
(Common Use task, close-ended), or they are instructed, instead, to generate a secondary 
function for an object (Common Alternative Use task, finite number of eligible responses) or 
an ad hoc, non-canonical function for the object (Uncommon Alternative Use task, open-
ended). This task, thus, allowed us to manipulate systematically the degree to which 
participants are asked a close- or open-ended question. In addition, we aimed to extend prior 
research on semantic memory retrieval strategies in open-ended tasks (e.g., Gilhooly et al., 
2007; Valeé-Tourangeau, et al., 1998) by manipulating stimulus modality (verbal, pictorial, 
or a combination of the two), to examine whether the type of stimulus would differentially 
guide participants’ responses as a function of the task requirements. In contrast to prior 
studies that involved multiple responses for the same stimulus (e.g., in the Alternative Uses 
task), here participants provided a single response for each study item that additionally 
allowed for the collection of reaction time measures for the task. Finally, we aimed to 
develop and introduce a novel coding system for single-response data on the Object Use 
task. Past assessments of creativity (e.g., the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking, Torrance, 
1974), have evaluated both verbal and figural aspects of divergent thought typically on 
fluency (i.e., the number of suitable ideas that were produced within a particular time 
period), flexibility (i.e., the number of unique ideas or types of solutions generated by a 
given person), and originality (i.e., the number of ideas generated by a given individual that 
were not produced by many other people), in addition to elaboration (the amount of detail in 
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a given response). Although these traditional metrics are important for assessing creativity, 
they would not have been able to capture our particular interest in this study in top-down-
driven relative to bottom-up-driven responses. As such, we developed a novel coding system 
that allows for the qualitative coding of responses on a continuum ranging from top-down 
responses that are based on the retrieval of abstract object properties (i.e., canonical 
function, use-specific mode of manipulation) to bottom-up responses that are based on the 
retrieval of concrete object properties (i.e., shape, size, materials, removable parts).
We hypothesized that: (a) if stimulus modality (verbal or pictorial) can influence the 
availability of object properties for retrieval, this should be significantly more pronounced 
during the open-ended components of the task (i.e., during the generation of secondary and, 
particularly, ad hoc uses). That is, when the task is open-ended, participants’ responses 
would differ depending on which object attributes are tapped by different stimulus 
modalities; however, when the task is close-ended, being prompted with the name or picture 
of the object (or a combination of the two) should not lead to differences across stimulus 
conditions, as measured by reaction times and our novel categorization system. We further 
hypothesized that: (b) if, as discussed above, pictorial materials render properties related to 
the learned actions associated with a given object more salient than other properties, the 
presence of pictorial stimuli will influence the extent to which participants’ responses are 
based on a top-down or a bottom-up semantic retrieval strategy, thus resulting in functional 
fixedness. That is, although they need not be associated with longer latencies, pictorial 
stimuli will interfere with the generation of non-canonical functions, leading to more top-
down-based responses, relative to verbal stimuli.
Method
Participants
Sixty-three right-handed, native English speakers (N = 63; mean age = 21.12 years, 23 
males) participated in this study for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of three conditions, based on the type of stimuli they were shown: (a) The Name 
condition (n = 22; mean age = 22.39 years, 8 males); (b) the Picture condition (n = 23; mean 
age = 21.59 years, 6 males); or (c) the Name and Picture condition (n = 18; mean age = 
21.88 years, 9 males). Participants across the three conditions did not differ in mean age and 
distribution of males to females. All participants provided informed consent according to 
university guidelines.
Materials
For the Picture condition, 144 black-and-white images of everyday objects, divided 
randomly into six blocks of 24 items, were used as stimuli. They were selected from a larger 
set of 220 items based on data from a different group of participants (N = 62, mean age = 
20.14, 28 males), who completed a web-based survey asking for the name of each object and 
for common, common alternative, and uncommon alternative uses for each of them. They 
further reported how easy it was to generate each type of use for each item (on a 7-point 
Likert-like scale). Objects with high name agreement (> 75%) and ease of use-generation 
rating (> 5) were selected for the experiment. For the Name condition, the stimuli were the 
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object names, as determined by the modal name produced by the majority of subjects in the 
norming study. For the Picture and Name condition, the stimuli consisted of the combination 
of the names and the pictures of the objects, with the image placed below the name of each 
object. Examples of stimuli are presented in Figure 1.
Each participant completed two blocks of each of the three experimental tasks (i.e., common 
use task, common alternative use task, and uncommon alternative use task) for a total of six 
blocks, the order of which was counterbalanced across participants. The assignment of 
stimuli to task conditions was also counterbalanced across subjects, and no stimuli were 
repeated during the experiment.
A desktop PC computer was used for stimulus presentation. A microphone compatible with 
the stimulus presentation program (E-prime, Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) and a digital 
voice recorder (Sony electronics, Inc.) were used to record participants’ voice onset and their 
verbal responses, respectively.
Procedure
For each experimental block participants performed either the Common Use (CU) task, or 
the Common Alternative Use (CAU) task, or the Uncommon Alternative Use (UAU) task. 
For the CU task, participants reported (aloud) the most typical or commonly-encountered 
use for each object (e.g., Kleenex tissue: use to wipe one’s nose); for the CAU task, 
participants reported a relatively common use for the object, that was frequent but not the 
most typical (e.g., Kleenex tissue: use to wipe up a spill); finally, for the UAU task, 
participants generated a novel use for the object, one they had not seen or attempted before 
or may have seen only once or twice in their lives, that would be plausible, yet, which would 
deviate significantly from the object’s common and common alternative uses (e.g., Kleenex 
tissue: use as stuffing in a box). Participants were informed that the tasks had no right or 
wrong answers and that they should feel free to produce any response they judged fit. They 
were instructed to respond as quickly as possible and to remain silent if unable to generate a 
response.
Each 7-minute block comprised 24 experimental trials, presented for 9000 ms followed by a 
fixation screen for 3000 ms (see Figure 2 for trial timing and composition). The task 
instructions were presented at the beginning of each block; a prompt also appeared above 
each trial item (i.e., “Common Use”, “Common Alternative Use”, or “Uncommon 
Alternative Use”; see Figure 1). Each subject completed a 5-minute training session 
consisting of three trials of each of the three experimental tasks. The experimental session 
lasted approximately one hour. At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed on 
the purpose of the study and they were urged not to discuss the experiment with their 
classmates.
Results
Each participant’s voice-onset reaction times (RTs) per trial were recorded for quantitative 
analysis. Participants’ verbal responses were further recorded and later transcribed for 
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qualitative analysis. We report the results for each of these measures separately in the 
sections that follow.
Analysis of Voice-Onset Reaction Times
Median voice-onset RTs were derived for each participant for each of the three experimental 
tasks (see Table 1), after eliminating any trials for which participants did not respond. Voice-
onset RT data from one participant in the Picture condition were missing due to a software 
malfunction. Median RT data were subjected to a mixed, 3×3 analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), with type of task (CU, CAU, and UAU) as the within-subjects factor, and 
condition (Name, Picture, Name & Picture) as the between-subjects factor. The results 
revealed a significant main effect for task (F[2, 118] = 349.67, p < .001, η2 = .86), but no 
main effect for condition (F[1, 59] = 0.26, p = .77, η2= .01), and no task by condition 
interaction (F[4, 118] = 0.65, p = .63, η2 = .02). Across conditions, planned pairwise 
contrast comparisons showed that the common use task elicited significantly faster responses 
relative to the common alternative (F[1, 59] = 493.19, p < .001, η2 = .89, Bonferroni 
correction) and uncommon alternative (F[1, 59] = 654.83, p < .001, η2 = .92, Bonferroni 
correction) tasks, which did not reliably differ from each other (F[1, 59] = 2.22, p = .14, η2 
= .04). Overall, the generation of common uses was associated with significantly faster RTs 
relative to the generation of secondary and, particularly, ad hoc uses. Regarding the effects 
of condition—predominantly for the open-ended components of the task—the type of 
stimulus was not associated with reliable differences in RTs. However, according to our 
hypotheses and previous research on functional fixedness (e.g., Chrysikou & Weisberg, 
2005), if during ad hoc use generation the presence of an object’s name or picture (or a 
combination of the two) influences the extent to which participants’ responses are based on 
top-down or bottom-up memory retrieval strategies, then these differences would be present 
in the kinds of functions participants would generate and not, necessarily, in the speed in 
which they would generate them. These are the differences we attempted to capture with the 
novel qualitative coding scheme for participants’ responses that we present in the following 
section.
Qualitative Analysis of Verbal Responses
Description of coding system for object function—Participants’ verbal responses 
were analyzed with a novel coding system that classifies object function in one of four 
categories, on a continuum ranging from top-down responses that are based on the retrieval 
of abstract object properties (i.e., canonical function, typical mode of manipulation; 
Categories 1 and 2), to bottom-up responses that are based on the retrieval of concrete object 
properties (i.e., shape, size, materials, removable parts; Categories 3 and 4; see Table 2).
In this system, responses are coded as belonging in Category 1 when they describe functions 
that are typical of the object’s canonical use (e.g., chair: to sit on) or reflect a use of the 
object in the same way but in a different context (e.g., chair: to sit on when on the beach).
Category 2 is meant to reflect functions that are not typical of the object, but which originate 
from top-down retrieval of object features that are associated with its canonical function and 
are not available simply by observing the object. Responses are also coded as belonging to 
Chrysikou et al. Page 8













Category 2 when the object is used to substitute for the function of another tool based on 
shared top-down or abstract properties (i.e., properties not visible or available without prior 
knowledge of what the object is); for example, using a football as a life saver is based on the 
knowledge that a football is filled with air and can float. This category is further used to 
describe the generation of a new function for an object, based on such top-down, abstract 
properties; for example, using a hairdryer to blow leaves is a function based on the top-down 
knowledge that a hairdryer is a device that blows air. Category 2 also includes responses for 
which an object is modified to allow for a new function based on top-down properties that 
cannot be inferred exclusively from its component features; for example, cutting a football 
in half and using it to collect water is a function based on the preexisting (i.e., not manifestly 
available) knowledge that a football is hollow. Responses that refer to common secondary 
functions for an object (e.g., ironing board: to fold clothes on) or which incorporate cultural 
and culturally-instantiated influences (e.g., sock: use as a stocking for Christmas) are further 
coded as belonging to Category 2.
Category 3 reflects functions that are distant from the object’s canonical function, and which 
originate from a consideration of the overall shape of an object after some modification. 
Category 3 describes functions generated from bottom-up properties of the object (i.e., 
properties visible or available without prior knowledge of the object’s functional identity) 
after minor modification. For example, folding a blanket and using it to carry things (i.e., as 
a bag) is a function originating from bottom-up properties of the item, which is far-removed 
from its use as a cover during sleep. Responses in which objects were used in the place of 
another object based on visual likeness are also coded as Category 3. For example, a bowl 
may prompt participants to generate the use “to wear as a hat;” in this case, top-down 
knowledge about the bowl (e.g., it’s use in food consumption) is overridden by the visual 
similarities to a hat (i.e., the round semicircular shape, the visibly hollow interior). Finally, 
functions classified under this category can further reflect the active modification or 
modeling of an object after a different item to allow for a function based on shared bottom-
up or concrete properties (i.e., properties visible or readily available without existing 
knowledge of the object’s identity). For example, a response that suggests adding straps to a 
tennis racket to make a snowshoe is based on the visual similarities between the tennis 
racket and the snowshoe. This response does not refer to previous top-down knowledge or 
the common functions for a tennis racket (even though abstract properties of the second item
—the snowshoe—are likely activated for the generation of this function).
Finally, Category 4 includes responses describing the generation of a function for the object 
based on specific bottom-up properties rather than the overall shape of the object; as with 
Category 3, these properties are visible or available without prior knowledge of the object’s 
identity; furthermore, in Category 4 the function is not based on overall visual similarity 
with an already existing item, as was the case in Category 3. For example, using a flashlight 
to open a beer bottle is a function based on a concrete, visually-observed property—having a 
thin, rigid edge—that does not reflect abstract, top-down knowledge about the object’s 
typical use. This category further incorporates responses involving the deconstruction of the 
object to allow for a different function based on the object’s concrete or bottom-up 
properties (e.g., chair: to burn and use as firewood). All responses that were vague, revealed 
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a misunderstanding of a given object, indicated the participant’s failure to follow task 
instructions, or otherwise did fall into categories 1, 2, 3, or 4 were coded as miscellaneous.
The present coding system classifies responses on a top-down to bottom-up continuum, that 
is, as being either closer to an object’s abstract normative functional identity (e.g., chair: a 
piece of furniture, something to sit on), or as reflecting a distance from that identity and a 
stronger focus on stimulus-guided knowledge retrieval of the object’s concrete, bottom-up 
properties (e.g., chair: an artifact made of wood, to burn and use as fuel for a fire). That is, 
we emphasize that classification of an object’s function in one of the four categories does 
not imply an absolute either-or distinction between retrieval of top-down and bottom-up 
properties of an object’s representation. We further note that due to our particular interest in 
the effects of verbal or pictorial stimulus modality and the nature of the task, this coding 
system focuses on the retrieval of visual object properties; although not present in our 
dataset, the present coding system does not exclude bottom-up properties from other 
modalities (e.g., tactile, auditory).
Rating procedure—The total number of participants’ verbal responses, across conditions, 
exceeded 8,000 items. Three independent raters, blind to the participants’ condition, were 
trained on the use of the coding system and coded all responses. Regular biweekly meetings 
were conducted to ensure compliance with the coding system, in addition to resolving 
coding disagreements among the raters. Inter-rater reliability between rater pairs was 
examined by means of the Kappa statistic, which includes corrections for chance agreement 
levels. The average inter-rater reliability (Kappa coefficient) was .83 (p < .001), 95% CI 
(0.79, 0.87), ranging from .63 to .99, which is considered substantial to outstanding (Landis 
& Koch, 1977). Any differences among the raters were resolved in conference. The ratings 
across raters (after consensus) were used for subsequent analyses.
Analysis of response type—To achieve the most direct assessment of the experimental 
hypothesis, after coding and analyses were completed on the four-category coding system, 
we computed the percentage of each participant’s answers under each category for each task 
(CU, CAU, and UAU, out of the total number of answers they provided for that task; see 
Table 3 for average percentages by category, condition, and task). Subsequently, we 
combined the percentage of each subject’s answers for each task separately for categories 1 
and 2 (top-down responses) and for categories 3 and 4 (bottom-up responses). We then 
classified categorically each participant’s performance overall for each task as 
predominantly either top-down- or bottom-up-driven, depending on whether the majority of 
their responses for each task fell under the one or the other category (see Figure 3 for an 
expression of these classifications in percentages by condition and task). Due to the 
qualitative nature of these results, we employed nonparametric statistics to examine whether 
participants generated predominantly top-down versus bottom-up responses for each task, 
based on the kind of stimulus they received. For the CU and the CAU tasks, all participants 
generated exclusively top-down responses (see Figure 3); hence, no measures of association 
were computed. For the UAU task, however, the association of stimulus condition (Name, 
Picture, Name & Picture) with response type (top-down, bottom-up) was significant 
(Pearson’s χ2 [2, N = 63] = 11.44, p = .003, two-tailed, Cramer’s ϕ = .43). Focused pairwise 
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analyses by stimulus condition with Bonferroni-adjusted α = .017 showed that, as expected, 
more participants who were presented with the stimuli in the form of pictures than 
participants who were presented with the stimuli in the form of words generated responses 
that were judged to be based on a top-down strategy (Pearson’s χ2 [1, N = 45] = 10.29, p = .
001, two-tailed, Cramer’s ϕ = .48; Fisher’s exact test p = .002). There was no difference 
between participants who were shown pictures and participants who were shown pictures 
and words (Pearson’s χ2 [1, N = 41] = 1.74, p = .19, two-tailed, Cramer’s ϕ = .21; Fisher’s 
exact test p = .30) or between participants who were shown words and participants who were 
shown a combination of pictures and words (Pearson’s χ2 [1, N = 40] = 3.74, p = .053, two-
tailed, Cramer’s ϕ = .31; Fisher’s exact test p = .09). Overall, the qualitative analysis of 
subjects’ responses showed that, as predicted, for the open-ended UAU task, pictorial stimuli 
elicited significantly more top-down-driven responses, closer to the object’s canonical 
function, than did verbal stimuli.
Analysis across the coding system categories—To examine differences among the 
conditions on the entire spectrum of the coding system, we first entered the percentage of 
each participant’s answers for each task (CU, CAU, and UAU; out of the total number of 
answers they provided for that task) for each category into a 4 × 3 repeated measures, mixed 
ANOVA, with category (1, 2, 3, or 4) as the within-subjects factor and the type of condition 
(Name, Picture, or Name & Picture) as the between-subjects factor. Given the vast majority 
of subjects producing responses that were exclusively classified under categories 1 and 2, for 
both the CU and the CAU tasks there was a main effect of category (ps < .001), but no effect 
of condition and no category by condition interaction (ps > .12). No post hoc comparisons 
across categories or tasks were significant (all ps > .11). In contrast, for the UAU task there 
was a main effect of category (F[3, 180] = 99.01, p < .001, η2 = .62) and a marginally 
significant main effect of condition (F[2, 60] = 3.09, p = .053, η2 = .09); the category by 
condition interaction was not significant F[6, 180] = 1.48, p = .19, η2 = .05). Post-hoc 
comparisons revealed a significant difference across categories between participants who 
received picture stimuli relative to those receiving the objects’ names (Tukey’s honestly 
significant difference test, p = .044). None of the other pairwise comparisons reached 
significance (all ps > .30).
We subsequently entered the percentage of each participant’s answers for each task (CU, 
CAU, and UAU; out of the total number of answers they provided for that task) that were 
categorized as top-down-driven into a 3 × 3 repeated measures, mixed ANOVA, with the 
type of task (CU, CAU, and UAU) as the within-subjects factor and the type of condition 
(Name, Picture, or Name & Picture) as the between-subjects factor. Participants generated 
more top-down-driven responses when they were instructed to produce the common function 
for the objects relative to secondary and ad hoc functions (main effect of task, F[2, 120] = 
205.65, p < .001, η2= .77). Although the task × condition interaction was not significant 
(F[4, 120] = 0.99, p = .42, η2 = .03), there was a significant main effect of condition (F[2, 
60] = 3.16, p = .049, η2 = .10). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that participants in the 
Picture condition generated significantly more top-down-driven responses than did 
participants in the Name condition (Tukey’s honestly significant difference test, p = .049). 
This difference was not significant between participants in the Picture condition relative to 
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participants in the Name and Picture condition (Tukey’s honestly significant difference test, 
p = .19) or between participants in the Name condition and those in the Name and Picture 
condition (Tukey’s honestly significant difference test, p = .86).
Analysis of omissions—To examine the possibility that the type of stimulus format 
might have influenced the number of trials for which participants did not give a response, 
particularly for the common and uncommon alternative tasks, we entered the percent of non-
responses by subject and task into a 3 × 3 repeated measures, mixed ANOVA, with the type 
of task (CU, CAU, and UAU) as the within-subjects factor and the type of condition (Name, 
Picture, or Name & Picture) as the between-subjects factor (see Figure 4). As expected, 
there was a main effect of task (F[2, 120] = 70.00, p < .001, η2 = .54), especially given that 
the number of omissions was minimal for the CU task relative to the other tasks; 
importantly, however, the results did not reveal a significant effect of condition (F[1, 60] = 
1.26, p = .29, η2 = .04) or a task × condition interaction (F[4, 120] = 1.26, p = .29, η2 = .04). 
Post-hoc pairwise contrast comparisons (Tukey’s honestly significant difference test) 
between conditions for all tasks were not significant (p > .30), thus confirming that the type 
of stimulus did not influence the number of trials for which participants did not provide a 
response.
Discussion
Coming up with creative solutions to problems, designing new products, or creating novel 
pieces of art often involves exposure to examples either generated by others or the creators 
themselves. Although examples can facilitate creativity through analogical transfer (e.g., 
Holyoak, 1984, 2005) or by constraining the creative task space (see Sagiv, Arieli, 
Goldenberg, & Goldschmidt, 2010), they can also lead to functional fixedness, thus limiting 
the generation of novel ideas. In this study we focused on the influence of verbal and 
pictorial examples for creativity and divergent thinking. We examined whether memory 
retrieval (specifically the activation of object representations) based on the influence of 
verbal and pictorial stimuli would differentially bias participants’ responses in the Object 
Use task; this task allowed us to manipulate systematically the degree to which participants 
are asked a close- or open-ended question. Our results suggested that (1) participants showed 
different biases toward top-down or bottom-up semantic retrieval strategies depending on the 
nature of the task (i.e., CU, CAU, UAU), such that canonical uses were generated faster than 
secondary and ad hoc uses; (2) although across all three tasks participants generally 
employed more top-down than bottom-up retrieval strategies, in open-ended, creative 
thinking tasks that involve the generation of secondary, and, particularly, ad hoc, uncommon 
uses for objects, the kinds of responses participants generated were based on bottom-up 
retrieval strategies more so than during the generation of canonical uses. This analysis was 
only possible through the classification of responses by means of our novel coding system 
that captures the extent to which a function is based on the retrieval of top-down or bottom-
up attributes of the object’s representation; (3) the effects of stimulus type (name, picture, or 
a combination of the two) on the availability of object properties for retrieval was, as 
predicted, more pronounced during the generation of ad hoc, uncommon uses. Specifically, 
during the UAU task the presence of stimuli in pictorial format primed top-down, abstract 
Chrysikou et al. Page 12













aspects of object knowledge that are more closely tied to the object’s normative function, 
more so than the presence of an object’s name. Interestingly, the combination of the two 
types of stimuli (i.e., name and picture) seemed to elicit performance that fell somewhere 
between that of participants in the other two conditions (Name, Picture).
Our quantitative and qualitative results showed that for the UAU subcomponent of the task 
there is an increase in the generation of bottom-up-driven functions (measured by our novel 
coding scheme), in addition to an increase in processing time (measured by voice-onset RTs) 
as participants are forced to move away from a top-down strategy of retrieving the object’s 
canonical, abstract, and context-independent function, so as to generate an atypical, specific, 
and context-bound use for it. These results suggest that even though we typically categorize 
objects by accessing our top-down, abstract knowledge of their functions, under specific 
circumstances that require creativity and divergent thinking—when such abstract 
information would be counterproductive (i.e., when one needs to use an object in an ad hoc, 
goal-determined way, e.g., use a chair as firewood to keep oneself warm)—our conceptual 
system appears to allow for a temporary retreat or reorientation to more basic bottom-up 
knowledge, as guided by task demands.
Critically, we have shown that stimulus modality significantly influenced participants’ 
response type, such that pictorial stimuli led to more top-down-driven (and less bottom-up-
driven) responses associated with the object’s canonical function, relative to verbal stimuli. 
This finding is consistent with the results of previous studies (e.g., Boronat et al., 2005; 
Chainay & Humphreys, 2002; Postler et al., 2003; Saffran, Coslett & Keener; 2003) showing 
facilitated access to action- and manipulation-related information from pictures relative to 
words. Importantly, the present research extends earlier findings by demonstrating that the 
action-relevant information elicited by pictorial stimuli does not pertain to general actions 
one can perform with the object—that are guided exclusively by its affordances (see Gibson, 
1979)—but rather that the elicited action information is tightly linked to the object’s 
canonical, normative function.
Related to the effects of pictorial stimuli, we note that our results did not show a significant 
influence of type of stimulus on voice onset RTs, particularly for the close-ended (CU) 
subcomponent of the task. In particular, the presence of pictures did not lead to faster RTs 
when participants were generating the common use of the objects. We note that some 
previous studies have reported both facilitation with pictorial stimuli or comparable RTs 
between stimuli in verbal or pictorial format, depending on the nature of the semantic task. 
For example, Chainay and Humphreys (2002) have shown faster RTs for action-related 
decisions (e.g., does a teapot require a pouring action?) from pictures, but similar RT 
patterns for semantic/contextual decisions (e.g., is a teapot found in the kitchen?) from 
pictures and words. Regarding the question about typical object function in the CU task 
component of the present study, it is possible that canonical function representations are 
accessed equally rapidly from pictorial and verbal stimuli, even though specific types of 
properties that comprise object function (i.e., manipulation-related properties) are accessed 
faster through stimuli in pictorial format (see also Boronat et al., 2005; Saffran, Coslett, & 
Keener; 2003).
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Our finding that participants in the Picture condition generated more top-down-driven 
responses during the ad hoc, creative use generation task, compared to participants in the 
Name condition, is consistent with studies of functional fixedness to pictorial examples in 
problem solving. As mentioned earlier, Chrysikou and Weisberg (2005) have shown that in 
an open-ended, design problem-solving task, participants prompted with pictorial examples 
were likely to reproduce in their solutions example design elements, even when these 
elements were explicitly described as flawed. In contrast, participants who were not given 
pictorial examples or who were explicitly instructed to avoid them, appeared immune to 
functional fixedness effects (see also Smith, Ward, & Schumacher, 1993). Similarly, 
participants’ responses in the Picture condition in the present study appeared strongly biased 
toward the retrieval of top-down, abstract properties linked to the objects’ canonical function 
during uncommon use generation. This finding may advance our understanding of functional 
fixedness from pictorial stimuli: Based on prior research on semantic memory retrieval from 
words and pictures as discussed above, we argue that the stronger bond between an object’s 
visual form (relative to its name) and function-related actions may have biased participants 
in the Picture condition toward the retrieval of features tied to the object’s canonical use. We 
further note that in the Object Use task a picture stimulus represents a single instance of the 
object category (e.g., a specific chair, knife, hairdryer) that is typical of that category and, as 
such, may prime the canonical function of the object. In contrast, a word can activate 
multiple instances of the object category across participants, which may also vary with 
respect to how typical they are of the object category. As a result, word stimuli may lead to 
increased variability in responses and reliance on bottom-up features depending on the 
specific instance of the category each participant will think about. Future work examining 
these effects with pictures of atypical instances of objects, as well as other modalities (e.g., 
auditory, tactile) may shed light on this issue. For example, a recent meta-analysis of 43 
design studies (Sio, Kotovsky, & Cagan, 2015) suggested that fewer and less common 
examples might lead to more novel and appropriate responses during creative design 
problem solving tasks.
Finally, our results build on those of Gilhooly et al. (2007) who analyzed participants’ 
strategies while generating multiple uses for an object in the Alternative Uses task, a variant 
of the task employed in the present experiment. Specifically, Gilhooly and colleagues 
reported that participants’ initial responses were guided by a retrieval strategy of already-
known uses for the objects, whereas subsequent responses for the same item were based on 
other strategies, including disassembly of the object and a search for broad categories for 
possible uses of the target object. Although participants in the present experiment generated 
only one function per object (either common, or common alternative, or uncommon 
alternative) given our intention to collect voice-onset reaction times, the types of responses 
generated for the ad hoc use conditions partially reflect the strategies detailed by Gilhooly et 
al. (2007). Our findings further extend this previous work by showing that stimulus modality 
(verbal or pictorial) can influence the type of retrieval strategy employed in open-ended 
tasks, with pictures leading to more top-down than bottom-up responses.
In sum, in this study we examined whether pictures and words will differentially influence 
access to semantic knowledge for object concepts depending on whether the task is close- or 
open-ended. Our results suggest that when generating ad hoc uses in an open-ended, creative 
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thinking task, participants exposed to a picture as opposed to a word rely more on top-down-
driven memory retrieval strategies and generate responses that are closer to an object’s 
typical function. Importantly, we have developed and applied a new coding system for object 
function that allows for a qualitative assessment of participants’ responses on a continuum 
ranging from top-down, context-independent, and abstract functions to bottom-up, context-
bound, and concrete responses. Future research can benefit from the use of these 
assessments for a comprehensive evaluation of semantic knowledge for objects in studies 
with normal subjects and patients and for different kinds of stimuli and tasks, thereby further 
illuminating the organization of knowledge about objects and how this knowledge is 
accessed in various tasks by different stimulus modalities. Critically, future studies can 
employ this categorization scheme to evaluate novel idea generation in the context of 
creative design or artistic products, especially following exposure to different kinds of 
example prompts. Such applications may have important implications for the use of 
examples in various educational settings (e.g., industrial and engineering design or art 
schools) to ensure that these instructional tools promote innovation and creative thinking.
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Examples of stimuli by condition and task
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Examples of trial timing and composition for: (a) the Name condition, (b) the Picture 
condition, and (c) the Name and Picture condition, for the Common use task. The timing and 
composition of the trials was the same for the Common alternative and Uncommon 
alternative tasks.
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Percentage of participants generating predominantly top-down responses by condition and 
task.
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Average percentage of omissions by condition and task. The error bars depict the standard 
error of the mean.
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Table 1


























Note. RT = Reaction times; CU = Common use task; CAU = Common alternative use task; UAU = Uncommon alternative use task.
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